Temple & Webster Group valuation analysis FY26

Temple & Webster Group Ltd. (ASX: TPW): July 2026 assessment Verified Answer #1

Executive conclusion Verified Answer #1

I use A$4.93—the last completed ASX close on Friday, July 24, 2026—rather than the incomplete July 27 trading session. Verified Answer #1

From A$22.57 on July 24, 2025, TPW lost approximately 78.2% over the year. Verified Answer #1

It also finished only about 9% above its A$4.53 52-week low and was down approximately 64% year-to-date. (fool.com) Verified Answer #1

My central conclusions are: Verified Answer #1

The collapse was primarily a valuation and expectations reset, not a collapse in sales. TPW entered the period on an extraordinarily high valuation—approximately 136 times FY25 EBITDA—but H1 FY26 revenue growth failed to translate into comparable EBITDA or earnings growth. Verified Answer #1

The most important fundamental problem was gross-margin compression from price and promotional investment: H1 FY26 revenue rose 19.8%, but reported EBITDA rose only 2.2% and NPAT fell 35.8%. Verified Answer #1

The May 2026 guidance reset confirmed a sharp deceleration from the growth rates embedded in the old share price: FY26 revenue was guided to A$665–675 million, only 11–12% growth, with EBITDA of A$20–22 million. Verified Answer #1

Leadership change and removal from the S&P/ASX 200 were additional sentiment and flow-related pressures, but they were amplifiers rather than the underlying cause. Verified Answer #1

TPW is not conventionally oversold on the latest standard RSI reading: its 14-period RSI was approximately 44, above the usual sub-30 oversold threshold. Verified Answer #1

Fundamentally, however, it appears modestly undervalued if management delivers approximately A$40 million of FY27 EBITDA. Verified Answer #1

My base-case DCF fair value is A$5.63 per share, with a discount-rate/terminal-growth sensitivity range of approximately A$5.02–A$6.46. Verified Answer #1

Against A$4.93, the midpoint offers only about 14% immediate upside—not a sufficiently large margin of safety to call the stock deeply oversold. Verified Answer #1

Base-case fair-value targets Verified Answer #1

| Valuation date | Base target | Upside from A$4.93 | Principal operating checkpoint | |---|---:|---:|---| | Current DCF, July 2026 | A$5.63 | 14% | FY26 guidance broadly achieved | | July 2027 | A$6.31 | 28% | Revenue approximately A$704m; EBITDA approximately A$40m | | July 2029 | A$7.91 | 60% | Revenue approximately A$852m; EBITDA approximately A$61m | | July 2031 | A$9.92 | 101% | Revenue approximately A$1.00bn; EBITDA approximately A$84m | Verified Answer #1

These are conditional fair-value targets, not predictions that market sentiment will necessarily place the shares at those prices on those dates. Verified Answer #1

Share-price and operating performance Verified Answer #1

Market performance Verified Answer #1

| Measure | Result | |---|---:| | July 24, 2025 close | A$22.57 | | July 24, 2026 close | A$4.93 | | Twelve-month return | −78.2% | | 2026 year-to-date return | −64.0% | | 52-week high | A$29.06 | | 52-week low | A$4.53 | | Market capitalisation at A$4.93 | Approximately A$579m | Verified Answer #1

(fool.com) Verified Answer #1

The striking feature is the divergence between sales performance and shareholder returns. Verified Answer #1

FY25 revenue was A$600.7 million, up 20.7%, while EBITDA was A$18.8 million, up 43%, and the company ended June 2025 with A$144 million cash and no debt. Verified Answer #1

H1 FY26 revenue then rose another 19.8% to A$375.9 million. Verified Answer #1

Thus, TPW did not experience a revenue collapse during the share-price collapse. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

However, H1 FY26 revenue growth did not translate into proportional profit growth: Verified Answer #1

| H1 financial measure | H1 FY25 | H1 FY26 | Change | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Revenue | A$313.7m | A$375.9m | +19.8% | | Delivered margin | A$101.5m | A$114.5m | +12.8% | | Reported EBITDA | A$13.2m | A$13.5m | +2.2% | | EBITDA excluding NZ start-up | A$13.2m | A$14.9m | +13.0% | | Profit before tax | A$12.5m | A$9.4m | −24.8% | | NPAT | A$9.0m | A$5.8m | −35.8% | Verified Answer #1

(announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

This was the core economic disappointment: the business sold much more product but generated virtually no growth in reported EBITDA and substantially less statutory profit. Verified Answer #1

Primary drivers of the depreciation Verified Answer #1

It is impossible to assign an exact percentage of the decline to each factor, but the following ranking best explains the causal chain. Verified Answer #1

Driver 1: Collapse of an exceptionally demanding starting valuation Verified Answer #1

At A$22.57 on July 24, 2025, TPW had an equity value of approximately A$2.681 billion and an enterprise value of approximately A$2.562 billion. Verified Answer #1

Against FY25 EBITDA of A$18.8 million, that represented: Verified Answer #1

[ \text{FY25 EV/EBITDA} = \frac{2{,}562}{18.8} \approx 136\times ] Verified Answer #1

The old price therefore assumed many years of rapid revenue growth, substantial margin expansion and near-perfect execution. (pwc.com.au) Verified Answer #1

At the July 2026 price, using my conservative A$150 million net-cash estimate, enterprise value is approximately: Verified Answer #1

[ 579 - 150 = A$429\text{ million} ] Verified Answer #1

That is approximately: Verified Answer #1

20.4 times the A$21 million midpoint of FY26 EBITDA guidance; or Verified Answer #1

10.7 times management’s approximately A$40 million FY27 EBITDA indication. Verified Answer #1

The fall from roughly 136 times historical EBITDA to 20 times FY26 EBITDA explains more of the share-price collapse than any decline in revenue. Verified Answer #1

In other words, the company continued growing, but the market ceased capitalising its distant profit ambitions at an extreme multiple. Verified Answer #1

Driver 2: Gross-margin compression and weak incremental profitability Verified Answer #1

H1 FY26 gross margin declined from 34.0% to 31.4%, a 260-basis-point contraction. Verified Answer #1

Management attributed this to greater investment in price and promotion. Verified Answer #1

Marketing expenditure increased 19.4%, while a A$1.42 million New Zealand start-up investment and higher depreciation and amortisation also depressed reported earnings. (templeandwebstergroup.com.au) Verified Answer #1

The mechanism is straightforward: Verified Answer #1

TPW lowered prices and increased promotions to acquire customers and market share. Verified Answer #1

Revenue rose approximately 20%. Verified Answer #1

Delivered-margin dollars rose only approximately 13% because each sales dollar carried less margin. Verified Answer #1

Operating and expansion costs consumed most of the remaining incremental contribution. Verified Answer #1

Reported EBITDA rose only 2%, while NPAT fell 36%. Verified Answer #1

That result invalidated the operating-leverage assumptions embedded in the 2025 valuation. Verified Answer #1

There were genuine operating positives: active customers reached approximately 1.4 million, up 14%; repeat customers represented 62% of orders; fixed costs fell from 10.5% to 9.4% of revenue; home-improvement revenue grew 47%; and Trade & Commercial grew 24%. Verified Answer #1

But these improvements were overshadowed by the deterioration in gross margin and statutory earnings. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Driver 3: A material deceleration in the FY26 growth outlook Verified Answer #1

In August 2025, management reported revenue growth of 28% from July 1 through August 11. Verified Answer #1

By the November 26 trading update, revenue growth from July 1 through November 20 had slowed to 18%, while the company retained its 3–5% EBITDA-margin framework. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

The May 13, 2026 update represented a more decisive expectations reset. Verified Answer #1

Management guided to: Verified Answer #1

FY26 revenue of A$665–675 million, only 11–12% growth; Verified Answer #1

FY26 EBITDA of A$20–22 million, only 6–17% growth; and Verified Answer #1

approximately A$40 million FY27 EBITDA if April’s new margin run-rate could be sustained, even under a low-growth scenario. (templeandwebstergroup.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Although April EBITDA of approximately A$2.5 million was a company record for that month, investors focused on the near-term revenue deceleration and the fact that the former A$1 billion FY28 revenue ambition had become considerably harder to achieve. Verified Answer #1

TPW fell as much as approximately 15% on the May update. (fool.com.au) Verified Answer #1

The May program—catalogue repricing, a changed promotional cadence, greater supplier support, restructured marketing campaigns and slower fixed-cost growth—shows that the company has meaningful profit levers. Verified Answer #1

But it also confirms that earlier sales growth had been partly purchased through price and promotion rather than generated with immediate operating leverage. (templeandwebstergroup.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Driver 4: Weak consumer environment for discretionary home purchases Verified Answer #1

Management stated in May that Australian consumer confidence had reached “historic lows” and explicitly cited this as the reason for rebalancing the business from aggressive growth toward near-term margin and profit. Verified Answer #1

Because furniture, furnishings and home improvement are discretionary and frequently high-ticket purchases, weak household confidence affects conversion, promotion levels and customer-acquisition economics. (templeandwebstergroup.com.au) Verified Answer #1

This macro factor was important, but it should not be overstated: TPW was still gaining market share and growing revenue. Verified Answer #1

The decisive issue for shareholders was that weak demand made it more expensive to maintain that growth and reduced the probability of achieving the old margin and revenue trajectory. Verified Answer #1

Driver 5: CEO transition and governance uncertainty Verified Answer #1

On April 23, Mark Coulter announced that he would move from CEO to Executive Chair, with former Temple & Webster executive Susie Sugden becoming CEO on July 1. Verified Answer #1

Coulter retained responsibility for strategy, corporate development and capital allocation. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

The appointment was orderly and involved an experienced former executive, but founder-CEO transitions often introduce execution uncertainty. Verified Answer #1

TPW declined approximately 8.9% on the announcement day, indicating that the market initially viewed the change as another risk during an already fragile period. (kalkine.com.au) Verified Answer #1

I regard this as a secondary driver: the valuation and margin reset had already begun before the transition. Verified Answer #1

Driver 6: S&P/ASX 200 removal and passive-flow pressure Verified Answer #1

S&P Dow Jones Indices removed TPW from the S&P/ASX 200 effective before trading on June 22, 2026. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

The likely consequence was mechanical selling by index-tracking funds and portfolios benchmarked closely to the ASX 200. Verified Answer #1

This is an inference from the index removal, rather than a claim that index selling explains the full decline. Verified Answer #1

It probably exacerbated short-term pressure, but it did not cause the underlying deterioration in valuation expectations. Verified Answer #1

Is TPW oversold? Verified Answer #1

Technical answer: not under the standard RSI definition Verified Answer #1

The latest available 14-period RSI was approximately 44.2. Verified Answer #1

The usual technical convention treats RSI below 30 as oversold, 30–70 as neutral, and above 70 as overbought. Verified Answer #1

An RSI in the mid-40s therefore indicates weak momentum, but not a formal oversold condition. Verified Answer #1

Broader technical signals remained bearish. (investing.com) Verified Answer #1

The shares are unquestionably washed out in price terms—down 78% and close to their 52-week low—but a large drawdown alone does not establish that a security is oversold. Verified Answer #1

A share can fall 75% and still be expensive if the original valuation was excessive or if earnings expectations have been permanently reduced. Verified Answer #1

Fundamental answer: modestly undervalued, but conditional Verified Answer #1

At A$4.93, TPW appears undervalued under my base case, but only by approximately 14%: Verified Answer #1

[ \frac{A$5.63}{A$4.93}-1 \approx 14.2% ] Verified Answer #1

That is not a large discount for a small, high-beta discretionary retailer whose valuation depends on EBITDA almost doubling in FY27. Verified Answer #1

TPW’s estimated beta is approximately 1.59, consistent with substantial market sensitivity. (stockanalysis.com) Verified Answer #1

The current valuation becomes attractive if all three of the following occur: Verified Answer #1

FY26 results finish near the A$20–22 million EBITDA guidance; Verified Answer #1

the margin-optimisation program produces approximately A$40 million FY27 EBITDA; and Verified Answer #1

margin improvement does not require such aggressive price increases that sales or market-share growth stalls. Verified Answer #1

If FY27 EBITDA reaches only A$28–32 million, rather than approximately A$40 million, the current share price may be close to or above fundamental value. Verified Answer #1

Oversold verdict Verified Answer #1

My verdict is “not technically oversold; fundamentally mildly undervalued but execution-dependent.” Verified Answer #1

I would classify TPW as a conditional recovery opportunity, not a confirmed deep-value or oversold security. Verified Answer #1

Discounted cash-flow valuation Verified Answer #1

4.1 Starting point Verified Answer #1

As of the valuation date, full audited FY26 results had not yet replaced management’s May guidance. Verified Answer #1

I therefore use the midpoint of that guidance: Verified Answer #1

FY26 revenue: A$670 million; Verified Answer #1

FY26 EBITDA: A$21 million; Verified Answer #1

implied EBITDA margin: 3.1%. Verified Answer #1

The latest reported balance sheet showed A$160.6 million cash, no debt and 119.68 million ordinary shares at December 31, 2025. Verified Answer #1

I use A$150 million net cash and 120 million diluted shares to allow conservatively for subsequent investment, buybacks and dilution. (templeandwebstergroup.com.au) Verified Answer #1

4.2 Revenue and margin assumptions Verified Answer #1

My base case deliberately does not assume that TPW reaches A$1 billion revenue in FY28. Verified Answer #1

Instead, it assumes the company reaches approximately A$1 billion in FY31. Verified Answer #1

It does assume that management substantially delivers the approximately A$40 million FY27 EBITDA run-rate. Verified Answer #1

Long-run EBITDA margin reaches 11%, below management’s historical aspiration for margins above 15%. Verified Answer #1

TPW’s published long-term framework envisaged delivered margin above 33%, fixed costs below 6% of revenue and EBITDA margin above 15%; my forecast is materially more conservative. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

| Fiscal year | Revenue, A$m | Growth | EBITDA margin | EBITDA, A$m | Modelled FCFF, A$m | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | FY26E | 670 | 11–12% | 3.1% | 21.0 | — | | FY27E | 704 | 5.0% | 5.7% | 40.1 | 18.6 | | FY28E | 774 | 10.0% | 6.5% | 50.3 | 24.8 | | FY29E | 852 | 10.0% | 7.2% | 61.3 | 31.4 | | FY30E | 929 | 9.0% | 7.8% | 72.5 | 38.2 | | FY31E | 1,003 | 8.0% | 8.4% | 84.3 | 45.5 | | FY32E | 1,073 | 7.0% | 9.0% | 96.6 | 53.1 | | FY33E | 1,137 | 6.0% | 9.5% | 108.0 | 60.3 | | FY34E | 1,194 | 5.0% | 10.0% | 119.4 | 67.5 | | FY35E | 1,242 | 4.0% | 10.5% | 130.4 | 74.5 | | FY36E | 1,279 | 3.0% | 11.0% | 140.7 | 81.2 | Verified Answer #1

4.3 Free-cash-flow calculation Verified Answer #1

I estimate unlevered free cash flow using: Verified Answer #1

[ FCFF = EBITDA - Tax\times(EBITDA-D&A)-Capital/lease\ reinvestment-\Delta NWC ] Verified Answer #1

Base assumptions are: Verified Answer #1

normalised tax rate: 30%; Verified Answer #1

depreciation and amortisation: 1.5% of revenue; Verified Answer #1

plant, intangible and lease reinvestment: 1.8% of revenue; Verified Answer #1

normalised change in working capital: zero. Verified Answer #1

The zero-working-capital assumption is conservative because TPW’s negative-working-capital model can generate cash during periods of growth. Verified Answer #1

FY25 free cash flow benefited from a A$21.7 million working-capital inflow, so simply extrapolating the reported A$37.9 million FY25 free cash flow would overstate normalised economic cash generation. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Under these assumptions, the formula simplifies to approximately: Verified Answer #1

[ FCFF = 70%\times EBITDA-1.35%\times Revenue ] Verified Answer #1

Lease payments are included in forecast reinvestment, so I do not separately deduct lease liabilities from enterprise value. Verified Answer #1

4.4 Discount rate Verified Answer #1

I use a 12.0% WACC, which is effectively a cost-of-equity rate because TPW has no conventional debt. Verified Answer #1

As a CAPM cross-check: Verified Answer #1

Australian 10-year government bond yield: approximately 5.07% on July 24, 2026; Verified Answer #1

TPW beta estimate: 1.59; Verified Answer #1

July 1, 2026 implied mature-market equity risk premium: approximately 4.18%. Verified Answer #1

Therefore: Verified Answer #1

[ 5.07%+1.59\times4.18%\approx11.72% ] Verified Answer #1

I round this to 12%. Verified Answer #1

Beta and equity-risk-premium estimates are inherently unstable, particularly after a severe price decline, so the sensitivity table below is more informative than treating 12% as exact. (tradingeconomics.com) Verified Answer #1

4.5 Terminal assumptions Verified Answer #1

Terminal growth: 2.5%; Verified Answer #1

FY36 EBITDA margin: 11.0%; Verified Answer #1

FY36 FCFF: A$81.2 million; Verified Answer #1

FY37 terminal FCFF: approximately A$83.3 million. Verified Answer #1

Terminal value is: Verified Answer #1

[ TV=\frac{83.3}{12.0%-2.5%}\approx A$876\text{ million} ] Verified Answer #1

4.6 Valuation bridge Verified Answer #1

| DCF component | Value | |---|---:| | Present value of FY27–FY36 FCFF | A$243m | | Present value of terminal value | A$282m | | Enterprise value | A$525m | | Add estimated net cash | A$150m | | Equity value | A$675m | | Diluted shares | 120m | | DCF fair value per share | A$5.63 | Verified Answer #1

The discounted terminal value represents approximately 54% of enterprise value. Verified Answer #1

That is material, but not unusually dominant for a growth business. Verified Answer #1

4.7 Discount-rate and terminal-growth sensitivity Verified Answer #1

| Terminal growth → / WACC ↓ | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | |---|---:|---:|---:| | 11.0% | A$6.09 | A$6.26 | A$6.46 | | 12.0% | A$5.50 | A$5.63 | A$5.77 | | 13.0% | A$5.02 | A$5.12 | A$5.23 | Verified Answer #1

This sensitivity addresses only discount-rate and terminal-growth uncertainty. Verified Answer #1

Operating outcomes could produce a substantially wider range: sustained EBITDA margins below 7% would support a value below this table, while eventual 12–15% margins would support a significantly higher value. Verified Answer #1

July 2027, July 2029 and July 2031 targets Verified Answer #1

I calculate the targets as a fair-value roll-forward, rather than applying an arbitrary P/E or EV/EBITDA multiple: Verified Answer #1

[ Target_t=A$5.63\times(1.12)^t ] Verified Answer #1

where (t) is one, three or five years from July 2026. Verified Answer #1

This methodology assumes: Verified Answer #1

forecast cash flows remain intact; Verified Answer #1

cash retained by the business is not destroyed through poor acquisitions; Verified Answer #1

buybacks occur at approximately fair value and are therefore broadly neutral per share; Verified Answer #1

ongoing option and share-based-payment dilution is approximately offset by buybacks or included in the 120 million diluted-share assumption; and Verified Answer #1

the required return remains approximately 12%. Verified Answer #1

| Date | Calculation | Base target | What must be true | |---|---:|---:|---| | July 2027 | A$5.63 × 1.12 | A$6.31 | FY27 EBITDA close to A$40m; margin approximately 5.7% | | July 2029 | A$5.63 × 1.12³ | A$7.91 | Revenue approximately A$852m; EBITDA margin approximately 7.2% | | July 2031 | A$5.63 × 1.12⁵ | A$9.92 | Revenue approximately A$1.0bn; EBITDA margin approximately 8.4% | Verified Answer #1

Interpretation of the targets Verified Answer #1

July 2027—A$6.31: This target depends heavily on FY27 EBITDA approaching A$40 million. Verified Answer #1

If EBITDA remains below approximately A$32 million, A$6.31 would be difficult to justify without a lower discount rate or faster subsequent growth. Verified Answer #1

July 2029—A$7.91: This does not require the original A$1 billion FY28 target. Verified Answer #1

It assumes revenue of approximately A$852 million and gradual, rather than immediate, margin recovery. Verified Answer #1

July 2031—A$9.92: This assumes the business eventually crosses A$1 billion revenue but earns only an 8.4% EBITDA margin at that point—well below management’s stated long-term margin ambition. Verified Answer #1

The target therefore contains operating upside if TPW ultimately achieves double-digit or 15%-plus margins, but meaningful downside if competition and promotional intensity prevent margin expansion. Verified Answer #1

What would invalidate the valuation? Verified Answer #1

Downside indicators Verified Answer #1

The base DCF should be reduced if: Verified Answer #1

FY26 EBITDA is below A$20 million; Verified Answer #1

FY27 EBITDA guidance is materially below A$40 million; Verified Answer #1

gross or delivered margin remains compressed after the promotional reset; Verified Answer #1

customer growth falls sharply after catalogue repricing; Verified Answer #1

marketing cost as a percentage of revenue rises again; Verified Answer #1

New Zealand, home improvement or Trade & Commercial consume cash without developing acceptable unit economics; Verified Answer #1

the new CEO changes strategy or incurs substantial acquisition risk; Verified Answer #1

buybacks fail to offset ongoing option and share-based-payment dilution; or Verified Answer #1

Australian bond yields and TPW’s required return remain materially above the 12% model rate. Verified Answer #1

Upside indicators Verified Answer #1

Fair value could exceed the base case if: Verified Answer #1

approximately A$40 million FY27 EBITDA is achieved without sacrificing market share; Verified Answer #1

repricing and supplier support restore delivered margin faster than forecast; Verified Answer #1

marketing efficiency allows revenue growth with lower customer-acquisition costs; Verified Answer #1

exclusive/private-label penetration materially raises product margin; Verified Answer #1

home improvement and B2B sustain growth above the core category; Verified Answer #1

management approaches its long-term EBITDA-margin aspiration; or Verified Answer #1

cash is deployed through materially accretive buybacks or acquisitions. Verified Answer #1

Final assessment Verified Answer #1

The past year’s 78% depreciation was mostly a de-rating from an extreme growth valuation after evidence that revenue growth was producing insufficient incremental earnings. Verified Answer #1

Macroeconomic weakness, the CEO transition and ASX 200 removal contributed, but the decisive issue was the combination of gross-margin compression, weak EBITDA conversion and slower forward growth. Verified Answer #1

TPW is not technically oversold under the conventional RSI test. It is close to its annual low and sentiment is weak, but its valuation still requires a substantial FY27 profit increase. Verified Answer #1

My DCF indicates A$5.63 fair value versus A$4.93, which is mild undervaluation rather than a compelling margin of safety. Verified Answer #1

Accordingly: Verified Answer #1

Current classification: speculative/conditional value; Verified Answer #1

DCF fair value: A$5.63; Verified Answer #1

July 2027 target: A$6.31; Verified Answer #1

July 2029 target: A$7.91; Verified Answer #1

July 2031 target: A$9.92; Verified Answer #1

Oversold verdict: No on standard technical measures; modestly undervalued only if FY27 margin execution succeeds. Verified Answer #1

Principal references Verified Answer #1

Temple & Webster Group Ltd. (2025, August 14). FY25 Investor Presentation. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Temple & Webster Group Ltd. (2025, November 26). Trading update. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Temple & Webster Group Ltd. (2026, February 12). Half-Year Results and Trading Update and 2026 Half-Yearly Report and Accounts. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Temple & Webster Group Ltd. (2026, April 23). Mark Coulter appointed Executive Chair; Susie Sugden returns to become CEO. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Temple & Webster Group Ltd. (2026, May 13). Temple & Webster Trading Update. (templeandwebstergroup.com.au) Verified Answer #1

S&P Dow Jones Indices. (2026, June 5). June 2026 Quarterly Rebalance of the S&P/ASX Indices. (announcements.asx.com.au) Verified Answer #1

PwC Australia. (2025, July). Retail and Consumer Deals Digest. (pwc.com.au) Verified Answer #1

Damodaran, A. (2026, July 1). Implied Equity Risk Premium data. (pages.stern.nyu.edu) Verified Answer #1

Trading Economics. (2026, July 24). Australia 10-Year Government Bond Yield. (tradingeconomics.com) Verified Answer #1

Investing.com. (2026, July). TPW Historical Data and Technical Analysis. (nl.investing.com) Verified Answer #1

*This is a valuation exercise, not personal financial advice. Verified Answer #1

The projected targets have high uncertainty and should be reassessed when TPW publishes its full FY26 results and formal FY27 guidance.* Verified Answer #1

Sources: [1] Temple & Webster Group - TPW - Stock Price & News | The Motley Fool [2] announcements.asx.com.au [3] announcements.asx.com.au [4] Retail and Consumer Deals Digest – July 2025 [5] templeandwebstergroup.com.au [6] templeandwebstergroup.com.au [7] Why did this ASX 300 stock just crash 15% to a 52-week low? [8] announcements.asx.com.au [9] Temple & Webster (ASX:TPW) Share Drop Explained: Leadership Shift and Market Reaction [10] announcements.asx.com.au [11] TPW Technical Analysis, RSI and Moving Averages - Investing.com [12] Temple & Webster Group (ASX:TPW) Stock Price & Overview [13] Australia 10-Year Government Bond Yield - Quote - Chart - Historical Data - News [14] TEMPLE & WEBSTER GROUP LTD [15] Damodaran On-line Home Page [16] Temple & Webster Group Ltd (TPW) Historische prijzen - Investing.com Verified Answer #1